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The role of social facilitation and imitation in group risk-taking 
was explored in two experiments. The first experiment tried to 
determine if individual risk preferences can be changed by the 
mere presence of others and if these changes can account for shifts 
toward risk. Subjects predicted which of two differentially prob- 
able stimulus events would occur in a series of 360 trials. Expected 
value of the choices was held constant by varying the payoff in- 
versely with the frequency of the two events. After 1808 trials 
alone, subjects were put into one of four conditions, Control, 
Audience, Coaction, and Group. In the two social facilitation con- 
ditions, Audience and Coaction, there was an enhancement of 
dominant responses (i.e., conservative choices). But the Group 
condition showed a change in the risky direction, indicating that 
social facilitation processes cannot account for risky shifts. Ex- 
periment II replicated the social facilitation effects found in Ex- 
periment I, but failed to find pronounced tendencies of individuals 
to make their choices consistent with those of others. These weak 
imitation effects were found for a situation in which only knowl- 
edge of others’ choices was accessible to the subject and in a 
situation in which both this knowledge was accessible and others 
were actually present. The implications of these findings for 
theories of risky shift were discussed. 
The comparison of individual and group decision-making under un- 
certainty and risk has received much attention in recent years. Most 
studies indicate that groups tend to take greater risks than individuals, 
and a rather large number of hypotheses has been offered to account for 
this phenomenon (Bateson, 1966; Brown, 1965; Burns, 1967; Flanders & 
Thistlethwaite, 1967; Kogan & Wallach, 1967; Marquis, 1968; Pruitt & 
Teger, 1968; Stoner, 1968; Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Wallach, Kogan & Bern, 
1962; Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin, & Sherman, 1968, 1969). But none of 
these hypotheses has enjoyed unequivocal support. The controversy 
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which developed in connection with the risky shift phenomenon has been 
exacerbated by two assumptions, both probably false, that seem to have 
been implicitly made by some parties to the controversy, They are: (a j 
a shift toward risk is an inevitable consequence of making decisions in 
groups; (E7) there exists a unique necessary antecedent condition w-hi& 
when discovered will explain this phenomenon completely. And the con- 
troversy has centered over the nature of this unique antecedent. 
That the first assumption is false is indicated by such recent results as 
those of Burns ( 1967), Marquis ( 1968), Marquis and 
Nordh@y ( 1962)) Rabow, Fowler, Bradford, ofeller, and Shibuya 
(1966), Stoner (1968), and Zajonc et ail. (1968). In these experiments a. 
shift toward caution was evidenced. That there does not exist a uniqz~g 
necessary antecedent condition for the occurrence of a shift toward risk, 
but, on the contrary, that there are many diverse su$ciefzd conditions, is 
suggested by the fact that all of the seemingly conflicting hypotheses 
have received solve support. Thus, for instance, the theory which holds 
that groups take greater risks than individuals because the responsibility 
for outcomes is diffused among the group members received support 
from experiments by Wallach et al. (1964) and by Rettig, Johnson, and 
Turoff ( 1967), although the latter authors found that a shift toward 
riskier actions occurs only if the responsibility can be shared with others 
who are known by the subject and who form a cohesive group with him. 
The hypothesis that the group situation allows the individual to become 
more familiar with the problem has been supported by Bateson (1966) 
and by Flanders and Thistlethwaite ( 1967). And the various theories 
involving cultural values (Brown, 1965) have also received some support 
( Hinds, 1962; Stoner, I968 ) . 
If it is assumed that a shift toward risk occurs not as a result of one 
unique necessary antecedent condition, but that there exist several pre- 
conditions which may lead to such a shift, and that there are others 
which may lead to a shift toward caution, then the controversy which 
has grown over the explanation of the phenomenon might be supplanted 
by a research effort directed at the discovery and enumeration of the 
various suficient conditions of risky and conservative shifts. This paper 
is concerned with one set of such sufficient conditions. 
Nearly all theories which deal with the shift toward risk assume that 
group decisions are riskier (or more conservative) because the group 
situation changes the risk preferences, or at the minimum the choice be- 
havior, of the individual members. Rowever, it has never been unequivo- 
cally shown that individual risk preferences (or choice behavior) change 
when a person becomes a group member, or that either of these can be 
changed in any way by social means. A paper by the late Andrew Blank 
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(1968) suggests that individuals do make riskier bets in the presence 
of others engaged at the same task than they make in the presence of the 
experimenter. But in that study, the risk of the bet was confounded by 
its expected value, such that the expected value of the riskiest bet was 
six times higher than the expected value of the most conservative bet. It 
is, therefore, impossible to determine whether changes toward lower 
probability bets indicated increased risk preference or increased ration- 
ality. Moreover, factors such as competition, conformity, and social com- 
parison might have interacted with the confounding mentioned above to 
produce the difference between individual and group betting. 
To see how changes in individual risk-taking tendencies might be 
brought about, let us assume that the sheer physical presence of another 
person increases the drive level of the actor. Support for this assumption 
derives from a recent review of the social facilitation literature (Zajonc, 
1965) in which it is assumed that the presence of others acts as a source 
of general arousal (D) and that it enhances the emission of dominant re- 
sponses. Most of the evidence supporting the social facilitation hypothesis 
comes from studies in which performance or learning is observed under 
social conditions and under isolation (Cottrell, Rittle, & Wack, 1967; 
Zajonc & Sales, 1966). But there has also been some evidence for social 
facilitation effects on choice and preference. Strain ( 1967) found that the 
preference of children for oddity is enhanced in the presence of others, 
and Goldman (1967) has shown that preference for a specific color can 
also be enhanced under these conditions. Thus, the social facilitation 
paradigm provides a means for exploring changes in individual risk- 
taking tendencies. Since social facilitation is assumed to operate when- 
ever people act in the presence of others, it also applies to differences in 
individual and group risk-taking. In regard to the latter, a social facilita- 
tion hypothesis would call for groups to shift in a risky direction when 
the group members are risky when acting independently, but it would 
predict conservative shifts when members are initially conservative. It 
is interesting in this respect that since the bulk of the literature indicates 
a shift toward risk in groups, we would expect the preference of individu- 
als tested alone to be on the risky side of the continuum. This seems to 
be the trend (see Zajonc et al., 1968, p. 93). Moreover, in cases where 
the group members are initially cautious, a shift toward conservatism is 
observed. These findings, however, are not a function of individual dif- 
ference variables but of situational factors. They come from studies in 
which items for decisions are classified according to whether they gener- 
ate initial risk or caution in the individuals. Thus, for instance, Stoner 
( 1968) compared group decisions on life dilemmas which invite risk with 
those which invite caution when they are considered by the individuals 
working independently. Shifts toward risk were found for the former 
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and toward conservatism for the latter items when these individuals were 
formed into groups. 
This paper reports two experiments in which we attempt to ascertain 
whether or not individual decisions are subject to some basic social in- 
fluences, such as the effects of the mere presence of an audience or of 
coactors. In addition, an effort is made to deternine if a tendency to 
conform to the responses of others or to imitate them is a part of the 
group process presumed to influence the individuals’ choices. Finally, it 
is the purpose of this study to ascertain whether such effects, if they do 
Occur, can account for differences between i~d~vid~a~ and group 
risk-taking. 
As in our previous studies (Zajonc et nl., 1968, 1969), a two-choice 
situation was used in which the subjects were presented with two events, 
each having a determined probability of occurrence on a series of 360 
trials. The subjects’ task was to predict which of two lights would ga on 
on each trial. They were rewarded proportionately more for predicting 
correctly the infrequent event than for predicting correctly the infrequent 
event, such that the expected values of the two predictions were equal 
This situation differs from the one used in much of the previous research 
on risk-taking in groups. The advantages of this method and the ways in 
which it differs from the life dilemma task were discussed in a previous 
paper (Zajonc et al., 1968, pp. 95-96). It may be argued that winning 2 
few pennies on each of 369 trials may be subjectively so trivial to the 
person that his “true” risk behavior has no opportunity of revealing itself. 
On the other hand, theories of group risk-taking do claim a generality ex- 
tending beyond the life dilemma task. Moreover, there is no reason to 
believe that the life dilemma task, in which the subject advises a hy- 
pothetical person about some hypothetical choices in a hypothetical situ- 
ation, is subjectively less trivial than one in which he can accumulate 2 
bit of real money. If results obtained in the present study are not eon- 
sistent with previous research using the life dilemma task, the generality 
of empirical work and of theorizing in the are2 of group risk-taking may 
be questioned. 
EXPERI[MENT I 
The main purpose of this experiment is to determine whether the 
presence of coactors and of passive spectators constitutes a sufficient 
condition for the occurrence of changes in individual choice behavior 
under uncertainty and risk. It is aIs0 our attempt to determine whether 
such changes in individual decisions, if they do occur under these mini- 
mal social conditions, account for the differences that arise when the 
same decisions are reached in groups. 
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METHOD 
Subject.s 
One hundred and thirty-two male undergraduate subjects were recruited from the 
paid psychology subject pool. A minimum of $1.25 per hour was guaranteed. When 
scheduled, subjects were told neither the purpose of the experiment nor that they 
could earn a greater sum of money during its course. 
Apparatus 
TWO l/25-watt lights, mounted on a small panel, served to signal stimuIus events. 
One light was mark’ed either 1 cent or R cents. The other was marked either 1% cents 
or 3 cents. For half of the subjects the left stimulus light was associated with the 
higher payoff, and for the remainder, with the lower payoff. A punched-tape program 
controlled the timing and sequence of stimulus events, Subjects signaled their re- 
sponses by means of switches and were given poker chips to tally their winnings. 
Stimulus events and responses were recorded on an Esterline-Angus Event Recorder. 
Design and Procedure 
All subjects were given 360 trials in 12 blocks of 30 trials each. There were two 
stimulus conditions to which subjects were randomly assigned: 
.6-.4 Condition. The two stimuli were programmed with .6 and .4 probabilities of 
occurrence. The payoffs for this condition were 1 cent and l?L cents, respectively. 
S-2 Condition? The stimuli were programmed with probabilities of occurrence 
equal to 8 and .2. In this condition the payoffs were % cents and 3 cents. The se- 
quence of stimulus events was random, with the constraint that one or the other of 
the above probabilities would be observed in each block of 30 trials. 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects were met by the experimenter and taken 
to their individual cubicles where they all worked alone for the first 180 trials. After 
a short while, the following taped instructions were given over an intercom system. 
(The instructions reproduced here refer to the .6-.4 condition. For the .8-.2 con- 
dition, the words “34 ( 3) cents” were substituted in the appropriate slots.) 
In front of you, you see two lights. Every ‘7 seconds one or the other will go on. 
You also see two response plates, During each ‘i-second interval you are to press 
one plate or the other to anticipate which light will come on. If you press the left 
plate and the left light comes on, you win 1 (one and a half) cents. If you press 
the right plate and the right light comes on, you win 116 (one) cents. If you press 
one plate and the opposite light comes on you win nothing. Also, if you fail to 
press within the 7-second interval, you win nothing. 
You can keep track of your winnings by the chips which you see in front of YOU. 
If you win 1 cent by anticipating the left (right) light, place a white chip into 
your bank. If you win 1X cents by anticipating the right (left) light, place a blue 
chip into your bank. Your winnings will also be kept automatically. We guarantee 
you a minimum OS $1.25 per hour and you get to keep whatever you win over that 
amount; that is, you will get $1.25 per hour, or your winnings, whichever is more. 
Stimuli were presented every 7 seconds and there was a l-minute rest period after 
each trial block. Blue poker chips were always associated with the high payoff light, 
‘The results for condition .8-.2 were reported at the I968 meetings of the Mid- 
western Psychological Association in Chicago. 
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and white poker chips, with the low payoff light. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to one of four treatments within each of the two stimulus conditions. 
IA treatment (24 subjects). At the end of the sixth trial block subjects in the 
Individual-Audience (IA) treatment were told that there was a student interested 
in viewing the experiment. If the subject didn’t mind, this student would join him for 
the remainder of the session. Upon obtaining the subject’s permission, the audience 
took a place in the cubicle behind him. The subjects and the spectators were warned 
not to speak with each other. The subject then continued as previously for I80 trials. 
IC treatment (24 subjects). At the end of the sixth trial block subjects in the 
Individual-Coaction (IC) treatment were told that due to scheduling difficulties, 
they cou!d no longer continue to work in their individual cubicles. They were taken 
in groups of three to a larger room where identical apparatus had been set up in 
booths. Each subject was seated at a booth where he could not see the others, and 
continued responding for another set of I86 trials. The subjects were warned not to 
speak with each other. 
II treatment (36 subjects). At the end of the sixth trial block subjects in the In- 
dividual-Individual (II) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment 
was over. They were then taken out of their cubicles by the experimenter and allowed 
to relax for about 3 or 4 minutes. They were not permitted, however, to speak to 
one another. After the rest period, they were ushered back to their cubicles and 
continued as previously for six blocks of 30 trials. 
IG treatment (48 subjects).3 At the end of the sixth trial block subjects in the 
Individual-Group (IG) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment was 
over. The experimenter then met all three subjects and led them to a room equipped 
with apparatus identical to that which they had used alone. Taped instructions were 
again issued over the intercom: 
Again you see the lights and the plates. Now you are working as a team. This 
time one or the other light will go on every 20 seconds. During this interval the 
three of you will work together to come to a unanimous decision as to which plate 
to press. After you decide, one of you will press the plate. We will tell you who 
will begin pressing, and we will also tell you when to switch. Once again, if you 
press the left plate and the left light comes on, ca& of you wins 1 (one and a half) 
cent. If you press the right plate and the right light comes on, ea& of you wins 
IS (one) cents. If you press one plate and the other comes on, or if you fail to 
press within the 2O-second interval, each of you wins nothing. Either you all win 
or all lose on every trial. Again, you can keep track of your winnings by placing 
the appropriate chips in your bank. 
Six blocks of 30 trials, each separated by 3-minute intervals between the blocks, 
were given. As announced to the subjects, there was a 20-second intertrial interval. 
Each subject pressed the plates during two of the six intervals. 
After the experimental session the subjects were asked to make three estimates: 
(a) “In your estimation, what percentage of the time were you pressing the right 
hand switch?” (b) “In your estimation, what percentage of the time would the 
average student at UM press the right hand switch?” (c) “Finally. in your estimation, 
what percentage of the time would a professional gambler press the right hand 
switch?’ They were provided with linear scales ranging from 0% to 100% in 10% steps. 
a The two control groups (II and IG) were also employed in another experiment, 
run simultaneously with Experiment I (Zajonc et al., 1969). 
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An explanation of the experiment was then given, and the subjects were paid their 
wages and their winnings. They were asked not to divulge the details of the experi- 
ment to their friends or acquaintances. 
RESULTS 
We shall first examine the effects of audience and coaction. As in the 
previous study (Zajonc et al., I968), the dependent measure consisted of 
the percentage of risky choices made on each block of 30 trials. Figure 
1 shows, for all conditions and treatments, the percentage of risky choices 
over the I2 trial blocks. Of immediate interest are the IA (Individual- 
Audience) and the IC ( Individual-Coaction) treatments as they compare 
with control subjects who continued to perform in isolation throughout 
the entire experiment (II). These results were evaluated by an analysis 
of variance in which the between-subject factors were the two stimulus 
conditions (.6-.4 and J-.2) and three experimental treatments (II, IA, 
and IC), while the within-subject factor was trial blocks, with the first 
and second sets of 180 trials nested within trial blocks. 
Two effects are apparent. First, there is a greater number of risky 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
TRIAL BLOCKS 
FIG. 1. Percent of risky choices under conditions of social facilitation and in groups. 
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choices in the .6-.4 condition than in the .8-.2 condition. For example, in 
the II treatment the asymptotic percentage of risky choices is 40.9 in the 
.6-.4 condition, but only 28.9 in the LG.2 condition. This difference across 
all three treatments is significant at the .OOl level (F = 21.90, 1 and 78 
df). The second result of interest concerns the differences in the per- 
centages of risky choices between the first and second halves of the ex- 
perimental session. This difference across all treatments and conditions 
is also significant (F = 42.32, 1 and 858 ~?f, p < .OOl). In addition, how- 
ever, we note that in comparison with the J--.4 condition, there is a sub- 
stantial reduction in risky choices from the first to the second set of MO 
trials in the S-.2 condition. These results are seen more clearly in Table 
1, which presents average data for the first and second 180 trials. The 
relevant interaction term was significant at the ,001 level (F = 12.18, 
1 and 858 df). It should be noted, however, that this interaction is due 
in part to the relatively high proportion of risky choices in the .8-.2 con- 
dition in the initial trials. Subjects in this condition, like those in the .6- 
.4 condition, show little preference for one or the other alternative at the 
beginning of the session: their choices vary between 45% and 55%. But 
while the .6-.4 groups remain near that level throughout the experiment, 
there is a significant drop in risk in the .8-.2 condition, 
The inspection of cell means in Table 1 reveals that on the second 180 
trials there was a reduction in risky choices in the IA and IC treatments 
in the .8-.2 condition. It is true that there is a drop in risk from the first 
to the second 180 trials for the .8-.2 control subjects as well. However, 
this drop does not reach an acceptable level of significance, and it prob- 
ably reflects merely the higher initial risk levels of this group. But the 
TABLE 1 
Avm~or: PERCENTAGE OF RISKY CHOICES OF SUBJECTS WORKI~VG IN ISOLATIOX, 
GOACTION, OR IN THE PRESENCE OF a SPECTATOR 
Condition and 
treat,ment First 180 trials Second 180 trials 
~~~ .__. _.--- 
.6-.4 Condition: 
II treatment 42_8de* 40. %de 
IA treatment 52.8f 47, I,* 
IC treatment 48.0,f 48.5?, 
.X-.2 Condition: 
II treatment 34. Oabc 28 9,b 
IA treatment 38.1,d 27.0, 
IC treatment 35.7&d 27.5, 
* Means having different subscripts are different’ at t,he .05 level by a Iiewman-Ke& 
comparison. 
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conclusions about the effectiveness of the audience and coaction effects 
must be restrained because of the lack of significant differences among 
the II, IA, and IC groups during the second 180 trials. Such differences 
would provide especially strong evidence for a social facilitation effect. 
In none of the treatments in the .6-.4 condition was there a significant 
change from the first to the second 180 trials. It should be noted that 
when the frequencies of the two alternatives do not substantially differ 
from each other, as in the .6-.4 condition, preferences for these alterna- 
tives also do not differ from each other. The largest departure from in- 
difference is 9.1%. Hence, the dominant response for the .6-.4 subjects, 
while stronger than its subordinate counterpart, is quite weak in com- 
parison with the dominant response in the &.2 groups. Here the cautious 
alternatives are selected on 2 out of 3 trials. We would, therefore, expect, 
according to the social facihtation theory, that the presence of coactors 
or spectators would act to enhance the preferred choices, and, within 
the limits of a ceiling, to enhance it more when the preference is 
pronounced. 
Do changes in risky choices obtained in the presence of coactors and 
of spectators explain shifts toward risk and caution found when indi- 
viduals make decisions in face-to-face groups? Figure 1 includes the data 
for the IG treatment and Table 2 summarizes them over the two halves 
of the experimental session. It is clear from Figure 1 and from Table 2 
that whatever process takes place in the group situation, it probably is 
not merely one of social facilitation. The IG treatment differs from the 
others in several respects. First, there is considerable variability over trial 
blocks during the second 180 trials. Second, while there is a drop in 
risky choices in the .6-,4 condition (a result replicating the previous find- 
ing of Zajonc et al., 196S), the percentage of risky choices increases in 
TABLE 2 
AVERACE PERCENTAGE OF RISKY GHOICES OF SUBJECTS WORKING 
IN ISOLATION AND IN GROUPS 
Condition and 
treatment, First 180 trials Second 180 trials 
.6-.4 Condition 
II treatment 42 8,t* 40. gdc 
IG treatment 51.7, 46.4f 
.8-.2 Condition 
II treatment 34.0,, 28.9, 
IG treatment 34 8bo 37.7,,, 
* Means having different subscripts are different at the .05 level by a Newman-Kenls 
comparison. 
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the JL.2 condition. An analysis of variance on data in Table 2 was per- 
formed, again using the two halves of the experimental session as a factor 
nested within trial blocks. This time, however, the degrees of freedom 
were reduced in order to equate the reliability of observations in the 
II and the IG treatments. The data points in this analysis consisted of 
groups of three subjects in both treatments. In the II treatment random 
“groups” of three subjects were composed, and the average responses of 
the members of these “groups” were treated in the same manner as the 
group responses of the IG groups. This analysis revealed a significant 
difference between the IG and II treatments (F = 7.07, 1 and 24 @, p < 
.O5), a significant difference between conditions (F = 27.71, I and 24 df, 
p < .OOl), a significant effect over the 12 trial blocks (F = 2.34, II and 
264 df, p < .Ol), and, finally, a just significant interaction among treat- 
ments, conditions, and sessions (F = 3.85, 1 and 264 elf, p < .05). The 
overall picture then is that in the .6-.4 condition the IG subjects behave 
differently from the II subjects, while the subjects in the social facilita- 
tion treatments (IA and IC) behave like the II controls. In the S-.2 con- 
dition the IG subjects also behave differently from the II subjects, as do 
the IA and IC subjects. The subjects working in groups increase their 
risky choices, and those working in coaction or in the presence of an 
audience decrease them. It is clear, therefore, that the sort of change in 
individual risk-taking that is produced by social facilitation cannot be 
responsible for group effects. In fact, some credence is lent to the view 
that the process by which groups come to decisions must be strong 
enough to overcome the effects of social facilitation. W 
process be? While we can only speculate at this point, it might well be 
that changes in individual risk preferences from alone to group are only 
part of the story. The other part has to do with how these risk preferences 
are reconciled by the group in order to arrive at a group decision. By 
adopting various decision schemes, a group can combine the preferences 
of its members to become more or less risky than the mean riskiness of 
its members taken individually. In this study, the group decision scheme 
in the IG treatment, as well as the risk preferences of the group members, 
was left to vary freely. 
There is another way in which the social facilitation groups differ from 
the IG treatments. In the IG treatment the individual members often 
announce their preferences, This knowledge is inaccessible to the IA 01 
the IC subjects. Hence, tendency to conform or to imitate may also be 
part of a process occurring in the group which is responsible for shifts. 
Our second experiment was carried out in an attempt to determine if 
the responses of other subjects play a significant part in the individual’s 
choice behavior. 
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EXPERIMENT II 
As just mentioned, the preferences of the group members are accessible 
to all in the IG condition. In the studies of coaction performed in the 
early thirties this was also true. However, in Experiment I the IC sub- 
jects worked in ignorance of each other’s choices. Since most of the work 
on shift to risk involves considerations about the forces that emerge in 
groups in which all members have knowledge of each other’s preferences, 
the role of pressures toward conformity or tendency toward imitation be- 
comes a significant factor in group decision-making. We shall attempt to 
establish whether conformity pressures which agree with the subject’s 
preferences and pressures which disagree with his preferences have an 
effect on his decision behavior. It is of interest in this study, also, to dis- 
cover if conformity effects interact with social facilitation effects. 
Since we are interested in effects on subjects’ preferences, we have 
chosen only the .a--.2 condition since subjects in this condition showed 
the most marked departure from indifference. Also, while unlikely, it is 
possible that the results of the previous experiment were in part due to 
the fact that the manipulation of social facilitation occurred after the 
subject had been in the laboratory for some time. It is possible that the 
results were due to a disruption of his pattern of responding by the in- 
troduction of a spectator or of coactors. Because the previous results 
were fairly weak, it is especially important to determine if the social fa- 
cilitation effect can be demonstrated less equivocally. In order to deter- 
mine if the timing of the social facilitation manipulation is indeed a sig- 
nificant factor, we first conducted a preliminary study in which subjects 
worked the entire 360 trials in isolation or in the presence of an audience. 
The second part of the study deals with the interaction between coaction 
effects and knowledge of others’ responses. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Thirty-eight female subjects from the subject pool maintained by the Psychology 
Department at the University of Michigan took part in the experiment. In contrast 
with the previous study, these subjects were not guaranteed minimum pay for their 
participation. By taking part in it they fulfilled a requirement in the introductory 
psychology course. However, they were paid their winnings. 
Apparatus 
The same apparatus as in the previous experiment was used for generating stimuli, 
one of which occurred 80% of the time and the other 20% of the time. The same 
punched-tape program was employed. However, the subjects indicated their choices 
not by pressing switches, but by announcing them into a microphone and writing 
them down on a score sheet especially provided for that purpose. The score sheet 
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contained 12 pairs of columns, each pair labeled “Left“ and “Right.” The sheet was 
divided into 30 rows, each row representing a single trial. The subjects indicated 
their choices by checking either “Left” or “Right” in the appropriate row and column. 
Design and Procedure 
All subjects were given 360 trials in 12 blocks of 30 trials. There was a 3-minute 
break after the 180th trial, and the subjects were allowed to leave their cubicles but 
not to talk with each other. For 20 subjects ( 10 in each group) the frequent stimulus 
occurred on the right side of their panels, and for 18 on the left side. Nineteen sub- 
jects worked in isolation for the entire 360 trials, and 19 worked in the presence of a 
spectator who was introduced in the same manner as in th,e previous experiment, 
except that the spectator was introduced not after 180’ trials but immediately after 
the subjects became familiar with their task. The spectator was also a female student. 
The payoffs associated with the frequent and infrequent stimuli were ?G cents and 
2 cents, respectively. B’elow are the instructions which were issued to the subjects 
after they were placed in their individual cubicles: 
In front of you, you see two lights. Every 7 seconds, one or the other light will 
go on. During each 7-second interval, you are to guess which light will come on. 
You are to make your guess out loud by saying “right” or “left” into the micro- 
phone, and then placing a check mark on the answer sheet in the appropriate 
“right” or “left” box. 
If you guess “left” and the left light comes on, you win 51 cent. If you guess 
“right” and the right light comes on, you win 2 cents. If you guess one light and 
the opposite light comes on, you win nothing. Also, if you fail to make a guess 
within the 7-second interval, you win nothin,. 0 You must make a guess before the 
light comes on. 
You can keep track of your winnings by means of the poker chips which are on 
the table. If you win 2 cents by anticipating the right light, place a blue chip into 
your box. If you win X cent by anticipating the left light, place a white chip into 
your box. 
In all other respects the subjects were treated as in the first experiment. At the 
close of the session an oral and written description of the study and its purposes was 
provided. The subjects were asked not to divulge their participation to others. 
RESULTS 
The Effects of Audience on Choice Behavior 
The results were treated as in the previous experiment in terms of 
percentage of risky choices on each of the I2 trial blocks. Figure 2 shows 
the percentage of risky choices for subjects who worked alone and for 
subjects who worked in the presence of an audience. Neither of the 
groups of subjects shown in Figure 2 had any information or cues about 
the choices of others. It is clear from Figure 2 that the social facilitation 
effect is rather pronounced. The changes in the procedure did not affect 
the results, which are quite similar to those found in the first experiment. 
Again, on the initial trials the subjects do not manifest preferences for 
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TRIAL BLOCKS 
FIG. 2. Percent of risky choices for subjects working alone and in the presence of 
an audience. 
one or the other alternative, the percentage of risky choices on the first 
trial block being nearly 50% for both treatments. However, the asymptotic 
level of risk is considerably lower than that. An analysis of variance was 
performed in which the treatments (Alone vs. Audience) and trial blocks 
were orthogonal factors, and in which, for the purpose of comparison 
with previous studies, the first 180 trials were compared with the second 
180 trials as a nested factor. This analysis revealed a significant change 
over trial blocks ( F = 13.42, 11 and 3Q6 df, p < .OOl ), a significant differ- 
ence between the first and second halves of the experiment (F = 32.15,l 
and 396 df, ‘p < .OOl), and a significant interaction between the treat- 
ments and halves (F = 4.97, 1 and 396 df, p < .05), During the second 
180 trials the subjects working alone averaged 31.6% risky choices while 
those working in the presence of an audience averaged only 23.8%. A 
Newman-Keuls test shows these means to be different at the .05 level. 
These differences are clearer than in the previous experiment. It may now 
be concluded with greater certainty that if there exists a dominant pref- 
erence, this preference will be enhanced in the mere presence of others, 
as predicted by the drive theory of social facilitation. 
The Effects of Cues and Coaction 
The second concern of the present experiment is with the presence of 
others coupled with the subject’s knowledge of their responses. It might 
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be expected that if mere presence enhances dominant responses, and if 
there exists a tendency to imitate others or to conform to what seems to 
be the group norm, then the combined effects of coaction and of the 
knowledge of others’ choices should have a greater impact on the sub- 
ject’s behavior than the effects of presence alone. It would also be ex- 
pected that when the behavior of others shows preference opposite to 
that of the subject, the effect of presence and of others’ responses would 
work against each other. Which of these effects is more resilient depends 
on the specific manner in which these two variables are manipulated. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Sixty-six subjects recruited in the same manner as in the preliminary part of this 
study were employed. Ten additional subjects, also females, were recruited from the 
paid subject pool. They were paid $1.35 for participation. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus and the punched-tape program were the same as in the preliminary 
study, 
Procedure 
Thirty-eight subjects were randomly assigned to the Coaction condition and ~9 
to the Alone condition. In addition to the instructions issued to the subjects in the 
preliminary study the present subjects also were given the following: 
Please put on the earphone-microphone system. It is hooked up to a central 
tape-recording system. Since different microphone channeis all come into this 
same system, it is necessary that responses be made in order. You are on channel 
two, which means you should be the second person to respond. Therefore, please 
make your guess immediately after the first person has responded. 
In the Coaction condition the subjects worked in the presence of a paid participant 
who was trained to make the appropriate number of risky and conservative choices. Of 
the 38 Coaction subjects I9 heard the paid participant make congruent choices and 
I9 heard her making incongruent choices. Thus, in the Congruent treatment the paid 
participant chose the frequent alternative on 65% of the triaIs, and in the Incon- 
gruent treatment on 35% of the trials. 
For each subject in the coacting condition there was a yoked control subject in 
the Alone condition. This subject heard the same paid participant as the coaeting 
subject. The Alone subject, of course, did not have access to the actuai choices of the 
coacting subject. Of the 19 subjects in each of the four cells, ten received the fre- 
quent light on the right and nine received it on the left. 
RESULTS 
Figure 3 shows the data for isolated and coacting subjects making de- 
cisions in the presence of congruent and incongruent cues. Again, we note 
an initial indifference between the alternatives, and a gradual reduction 
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FIG. 3. The effect of coaction and congruent and incongruent cues on the percent 
of risky choices. 
in choices of the risky alternative. The analysis of variance on these re- 
sults shows a significant trial-block effect (F = 24.84, 11 and 792 df, p < 
.OOl) with the first and second HO-trial blocks also significantly different 
from each other across all treatments and conditions (F = 90.45, 1 and 
792 dj, p < .OOl). Also significant is the three-way interaction among the 
effects of coaction, cues, and halves of the experimental session (F = 
21.67, 1 and 792 df, p < .OOl). Table 3 summarizes these results for the 
first and the second halves of the experiment. It is immediately apparent 
that the knowledge of others’ choices does not produce simple effects. 
Let us first consider the ,effects of these cues when there are no coactors 
and the subject works in isolation. It seems that the individual’s choice 
behavior is affected as we would expect, but primarily on the first 180 
trials. That is, the knowledge of others’ choices delayed the subject in 
reaching an asymptote. We note from Table 3 that on the second 180 
trials isolated subjects working with congruent cues have nearly the 
same level of risk as those working with incongruent cues (25.1 vs. 26.8). 
The effect of cues in coaction is different. For subjects working in co- 
acting groups it seems that the knowledge of others’ choice affects not so 
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TABLE 3 
THE EFFECTS OF COACTION AND OF COK!TORS’ ~aorcm ox DWZSION 
Condition and treatment First 180 this Second 180 trials 
Alone: 33.0 
Conguent cues 30.4&d* 
Incongruent cues 35.5,s 
Co&ion: 36.4 
Congruent cues 38.4, 
Incongruent cues 34.5abc 
Congruent cues (both treatments) 
Incongruent cues (both treatments) 
34.4 
35.0 
* Means having different subscripts are different, at the .05 level by a Yewman-Keuk 
comparison. 
much the early levels of risk, but change over time. The curves for the 
coacting subjects intersec-t, while those for subjects working alone diverge 
initially and then converge. Looking at the differences between the first 
and second 180~trial sets we note that with congruent cues the coacting 
subjects drop from the first to the second half of the session by 9.9%, 
while with incongruent cues by 3.4%. Thus, one might say that in tbe 
presence of coactors the subject’s knowledge that their preferences dis- 
agree with his prevents him from reaching as low an asymptote as when 
their preferences agree with his. It is clear from Figure 3 that in coaction, 
subjects confronted with incongruent cues tend to increase their risky 
choices beginning with trial-block 7, showing that they are finally be- 
ginning to agree with their coactors. For subjects working in isolation, 
however, we noted that agreement with information provided by others 
takes effect rather earlier. 
DISCUSSION 
We have argued that there are probably many antecedent conditions 
which are sufficient for producing differences between individual and 
group decision-making that involve risk. One of the simplest of these 
antecedents must surely be the sheer physical presence of other individ- 
uals; for whatever processes are implicated in the group situation, at the 
very least, the joint presence of the group members is obviously a primary 
component. And with respect to the variable of presence of coactors and 
of spectators, it was shown that individual choice behavior under risk is 
sensitive to social facilitation effects. As predicted by the drive theory of 
social facilitation, when there is a dominant response, as there was here 
in the case of preference for the conservative alternative, the presence of 
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others enhances its emission. The data from both experiments indicate 
that while individuals making decisions alone seem to prefer the con- 
servative alternative, their preference becomes more pronounced in the 
presence of spectators or coactors. 
But the direction of this effect together with data on group decision- 
making leads one to con&de that a simple socia1 facihtation effect cannot 
account for the diiferences found between individual and group decision- 
making. Nor does it appear that information provided by others as to 
their choice is sufficient to produce shifts toward conservatism or toward 
risk in groups. The processes of imitation or conformity do not affect in- 
dividual choice behavior in ways that would readily explain group shifts. 
It is surprising, especially in the light of the value theories of risky 
shift (Brown, 1965; Nordhoy, 1962; Stoner, 1968)) that knowledge about 
others decisions had such a weak effect on the subjects’ choices. Accord- 
ing to Brown ( 1965), f or instance, shifts toward risk occur by virtue of 
the following psychological process : 
Perhaps riskiness is indeed an American value and each individual answering 
the Stoner problems means to be at least as risky as people like himself. . . . How- 
ever, the individual who has not talked with anyone about the problems cannot 
know how to be truly risky because risk is relative to a group norm and the lo- 
cation of the norm on the scale of probabilities is not known. Each man, on his 
own, guesses the norm to be at or below his own selection. When individuals talk 
together and disclose their decisions the actual distribution is made known. Those 
who find themselves below the mean of the six members of the group discover 
that they are failing to realize the ideal of riskiness that they have thought, they 
were realizing. Consequently they feel impelled to move in a risky direction both 
in accepting the decision of the group and in changing their private opinions. 
[P. 7011 
We do have some information in Experiment I about the subjects’ esti- 
mates of their own and others’ levels of risk. Since we are primarily in- 
terested in those subjects who did not have access to others’ choices, we 
shall first deal with these estimates for the II, IA, and IC groups com- 
bined. The estimates of the subjects’ own risk level were 38.1% in the 
.6-.4 condition and 23.2% in the .8-.2 condition. The estimates of what 
“an average student at the University of Michigan” would do were 38.3% 
and 26.1%, respectively. Neither of these differences approaches signif- 
icance. The subjects’ estimates of their own risk levels also do not differ 
from their estimates of “a professional gambler’s” risk level. These latter 
averages were 39.5% for the .6-.4 condition and 26.3% for the .8-.2 condi- 
tion. But there were also no systematic differences between subjects’ 
estimates of their own and others’ choices even when they had informa- 
tion about two other subjects. In the IG treatment, the .6-.4 subjects 
thought they were a bit riskier than the average student (46.8% for own 
risk and 44.0% for others’ risk), and the S-.2 subjects thought they were 
more conservative than the average student (26.9% for own risk and 30.5% 
for others’ risk). These differences did not approach significance. 
The most interesting results in these estimates is that in every condition 
and every treatment there was a consistent underestimation of one’s own 
actual level of risk. Thus, for instance, if we look only at the last 180 
trials, the average actual percentage of risky choices in the II, IA, and IC 
treatments was 45.5% for the .6-.4 condition and 27.8% for the .8-.2 condi- 
tion.* In the first condition the subjects in the II, IA, and IC treatments 
underestimated their actual risk by 7.4% and in the second by 4.6%. The 
first underestimation is significant at the ,001 level (t = 3.00), and the 
second ju.st fails to reach the acceptable level (t = 1.91) . 
Although the subjects’ estimates of their own actual risk level are 
numerically inaccurate, they are accurate on a relative basis. The eor- 
relations between actual and estimated levels of own risk range from .66 
to .90. The accuracy of the subjects’ relative risk level is most pronounced 
when they had access to others’ decisions, as in the IG treatment. If, for 
each group in the I@ treatment, we identify the member who was the 
highest, the member who was moderate, and the member who was the 
lowest in risk on trials when he worked independently, we can determine 
whether these latter three categories of subjects perceive the risk levels 
of their peers in the same manner. The results are quite clear here. Tn- 
dependently of whether the individual is high, medium, or low in initial 
risk, his judgment of peers’ risk is the same. However, as we would expect 
from the correlation coefficients reported above, subjects high in relative 
risk attribute higher risk to themselves than members moderate or low 
in risk. This is true in the X--.4 as well as in the S-.2 condition. Moreover, 
the same comparison was made in the random “groups” composed of the 
II subjects, yielding the same results, although somewhat weaker. 
as we would expect, the between-subject variance of the subjects’ esti- 
mates of their own level of risk is consistently larger than that of their 
estimates of others. This is, of course, more pronounced in the IG groups 
where these was an opportunity for a comparison. In the IG groups for 
both stimulus conditions combined the variance of subjects’ estimates of 
their own risk was 381.6 while the variance of their estimates of others’ 
risk was 210.6, a difference significant at the .05 level (F = 1.81, 48 and 
48 df). For the II, IA, and IC treatments these variances are 406.7 and 
243.8, respectively, also significantly different at the .05 level (F = 1.67, 
84 and 84 df ) . 
*The subjects were instructed to estimate the percentages of their choices over 
the entire session in the II, IA, and IC groups. Subjects in the IG treatment estimated 
their choices on the first 180 trials alone, when they worked independently. 
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The fact that there are no differences between the estimates of sub- 
jects’ own risk and the risk of their peers disagrees with the conjectures 
advanced by Brown ( 1965) and with data reported by Hinds ( 1962) and 
by Wallach and Wing ( 1968)) who asked subjects to indicate the re- 
sponse to life dilemmas made by “the majority of your fellow students.” 
Both Hinds and Wallach and Wing found that these subjects believed 
others to have lower risk levels. These comparisons, however, are be- 
tween the actual level of risk of the given subject (as measured by his 
responses to life dilemmas) and his estimates of others’ responses. In the 
present experiments, too, there was a similar difference. The subjects did 
in fact estimate others to be more conservative than they themselves 
actually were. But, of course, they estimated others to be no more risky 
and no more conservative than they estimated themselves to be. 
It should be noted that subjects in the Wallach and Wing study, knew 
that they would be asked about others’ responses at the time they were 
giving their own, a condition inviting social comparison. The data in their 
study were collected by means of a mail questionnaire, and the respond- 
ents must have seen the entire instructions before giving answers. 
Whether the same estimates of others’ risk would be obtained if the sub- 
jects were not required to give their own choices is a question which can 
only be answered by further research. Another question which must 
await further research and which is suggested by the results of our Ex- 
periment I is whether we can assume the perception of the subject’s own 
risk level to be identical to his actual risk-taking behavior. The value 
theory of risk and the research associated with these studies, of course, 
hold that the subject perceives his own risk-taking tendencies accurately. 
Our data contradict this assumption, at least for binary choices. 
The data in Experiment II are in still greater disagreement with the 
value theory of risk. This theory predicts that when the individua1 dis- 
covers that his risk level is lower than that of others, he shouId make the 
appropriate adjustment upward to meet the ideal. The conditions of this 
hypothesis are met for subjects who received incongruent cues. These 
subjects discovered that others chose the risky alternative on 65% of the 
trials. Yet the effect of this knowledge was numerically negligible. It 
would seem, therefore, that the value theory of risky shift does not apply 
to the present situation. 
We are led to conclude that the significant antecedent conditions for 
risky or conservative shifts for tasks such as those in the above experi- 
ments are to be found in the process of interaction among the group 
members as they come to decisions. One of the critical features of this 
interaction must be the process by which a group reconciles the choice 
or risk preferences of the individual members. The existence of differ- 
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eaces in the members’ preference for one alternative or the other is likely 
to generate discussion among them leading to the group choice. Implicit 
or explicit in this process is a rule for combining individual preferences 
into a single group choice. Majority rule, oligarchy, or taking turns, etc., 
are among the various rules which may be used in group decision-making, 
Research on risky shift has paid little attention thus far to the nature of 
these implicit or explicit rules of group decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty. 
It is also evident from the above experiments, however, that whatever 
are the significant processes of group decision-making, they must be 
sufficiently robust to overcome the effects of social facilitation or imita- 
tion. In previous studies (Zajonc et al., 1968, 1969) we thought that group 
shifts could be explained without assuming changes in individual risk 
preferences or choice behavior. It is now clear that individual choice 
behavior is indeed affected by rather elementary social conditions, and 
it will become necessary for future research to determine the way in 
which the complex component processes of group decision-making inter- 
act with the simpler processes of social facilitation or imitation 
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